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1 Problem
Alicja (3 yrs) attempted to break her mug at our breakfast yesterday. How did
she go about this? She slowly moved the mug towards the edge of our table until
it tilted and began to fall down. It did not break, however, as I caught it before
it hit the floor. I scolded Alicja for attempting to break her mug, but she did not
agree. So we had a row. To convince her, I gave her a short talk on agency and in
particular, on the stit theory, but I cannot call it a success. I nevertheless report
on our exchange as (I think) it casts light on two questions: (1) to what extent is
attempting an intentional concept? And (2) how far can one get in analyzing it
in the stit framework?
In what follows I make three assumptions. First, “to attempt” is a so-called
accomplishment verb, which means that its meaning changes with tenses. A
sentence in the past tense, like “I attempted to prove this lemma yesterday”,
implicates that I failed to prove it. My assertion, “I am attempting to prove this
lemma”, however, is consistent with my success as well as with my failure. In this
text I leave aside this complexity and arbitrarily assume the past-tense meaning
of “to attempt”, i.e., I take it that attempting is always unsuccessful. Second,
I assume an idealization that attempting occurs at point-like moments. Third,
although English grammar prescribes the form “α attempts to break her mug”,
I suggest a little linguistic reform here: I will write “α attempts that her mug
will be (is) broken”. In other words, I assume that “α attempts that . . . ” is a
propositional operator, my aim being to find adequate truth-conditions for it.
2 Stit, branching time (BT), Agents, and Choices
Stit is an acronym for the phrase “see to it that” which, as Belnap, Perloff and Xu
(2001) have suggested, might serve to draw a distinction between agentive and
non-agentive sentences. To give an example, the sentence “I am going to Prague”
is ambiguous, as in some contexts it is agentive and in others it is not. But, if its
assertion in a given context can be paraphrased by using the stit form—that is as
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“I see to it that I am going to Prague”—the sentence is agentive; otherwise it is
not.
The stit theory presents the task of understanding agency by explaining the
phrase “see to it that”. The phrase is assumed to be represented by a propositional
operator, written as stit; the task amounts to providing a semantics for this
operator. The explanation does not appeal to mental concepts, like the agents
being conscious, or driven by some intentions, or constrained by moral norms and
values. This does not mean that an agent’s actions do not have such aspects. The
idea is that basic features of actions can be understood without taking recourse
to mental concepts, and if there is a need for such a concept, the stit theory will
lend itself to an appropriate supplementation.
The semantics for stit is based on the theory of branching time (BT), which was
put forward by Prior (1967). A language L considered has, besides the stit opera-
tor, the tense operators P (it was the case that ) and F (it will be the case that),
the operators of historical possibility and historical necessity, respectively, Poss
and Sett, the tense indexicals like ‘now’ or ‘tomorrow’, and the truth-functional
connectives ∨,∧,¬,→ of disjunction, conjunction, negation, and (material) im-
plication, respectively.
It is assumed that the atomic sentences of our language L are in the present
tense and significantly tensed. We read “F : Kasia reads a book” as “Kasia
will read a book” and analogously for the past tense operator P . The sentence
“Sett : P : Kasia goes to Warsaw” is read as “It is (already) settled that Kasia
has gone to Warsaw”. In a similar vein, “Poss : F : Kasia goes to Warsaw” is
rendered as “It is (still) possible that Kasia will go to Warsaw”.
Turning to the branching time theory, its model W = 〈W,!〉 is a non-empty
and partially ordered set, subject to the condition of no backward branching—
∀x, y, z ∈W (x ! z ∧ y ! z → x ! y ∨ y ! x),
and the condition of historical connection, i.e.,
∀x, y ∈W ∃z ∈W : (z ! x ∧ z ! y).
Since histories are defined as maximal chains in W , the last condition implies
that every two histories intersect, which justifies the condition’s name. Elements
of W are called “events”, which is rather unintuitive since a BT event is an
instantaneous slice of the universe, i.e., a class of point events simultaneous with
a given point event. (As the theory assumes absolute simultaneity, it is pre-
relativistic.) Finally, x ! y means that y belongs to a possible future of x, or
(equivalently) that x is in the past of y. We write Hist for the set of histories in
W.
There is a family of undividedness relations ≡e onHist, parametrized by events
e ∈ W and defined as h1 ≡e h2 iff ∃e′ e′ ∈ h1 ∩ h2 ∧ e < e′. It is straightforward
to see that ≡e is an equivalence relation on H(e) := {h ∈ Hist | e ∈ h}. Thus, ≡e
induces the partition Πe of H(e).
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Some BT models allow for the introduction of a set Ins of instants, thought
of as instantaneous moments at which events occur. It is required that (1) every
element of Ins and every history intersect at a single event, and that (2) Ins
respects ordering ! on W , which amounts to the following conditions. For every
e1, e2, e′1, e′2 ∈W , every i1, i2∈Ins, every h1, h2∈Ins:
h1 ∩ i1 = h1 ∩ i2 ⇒ h2 ∩ i1 = h2 ∩ i2 (1)
(e1∈h1 ∩ i1 ∧ e2 ∈ h1 ∩ i2 ∧ e1<e2 ∧ e′1 ∈ h2 ∩ i1 ∧ e′2 ∈ h2 ∩ i2)⇒ e′1 < e′2. (2)
We write i(e) for the instant determined by event e.
Turning to the BT semantics, Prior’s main semantical idea is to take for evalua-
tion points the event-history pairs in which the event belongs to the history. Such
a pair is written as e/h. A BT semantical model M = 〈W, I〉 for our language
L consists of a BT model W and an interpretation function I : Atoms→ P(W ),
where Atoms is the set of atomic formulas of L. The evaluation is defined as
follows:
For A an atomic formula: M, e/h |= A iff e ∈ I(A); (3)
M, e/h |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that M, e/h |= ϕ; (4)
and similarly for the other classical connectives; (5)
M, e/h |= F : ϕ iff there is e′ > e such that M, e′/h |= ϕ; (6)
and analogously for a formula with P as the main operator; (7)
M, e/h |= Ati ϕ iff M, e′/h |= ϕ, where e′ ∈ i ∩ h; (8)
M, e/h |= Sett : ϕ iff for every h′, if e ∈ h′, then M, e/h′ |= ϕ. (9)
Poss : ϕ is defined as equivalent to ¬ : Sett : ¬ϕ.
To represent agents’ actions, one first postulates a non-empty set Agents. Then
choices available to Agents at events from W are coded by a “choice function”
Choice : Agents×W −→ P(Hist) subject to the conditions: (1) Choice(α, e) is a
partition of H(e) and (2) if h ∈ Choice(α, e) and h ≡e h′, then h′ ∈ Choice(α, e).
We will write Choiceαe for Choice(α, e) and Choiceαe 〈h〉 for the element of Choiceαe
determined by h (this is defined provided that h ∈ H(e)).
3 First idea: attempting is risking
Our analysis of attempting will proceed in stages. The first idea is to link at-
tempting to risking. Namely, α attempted that the mug be broken (R) at instant
i means that she risked that R at instant i. We suggest analyzing this in the
following manner: there was an option available to α in which certainly ¬R (the
mug is not broken) at i, but α chose another option which allowed that the mug
be broken at i (see Figure 1). In symbols our proposal reads:
M, e/h |= α risks that AtiR iff
1. ∃h′ ∈ Hist : h′ ∈ Choiceαe 〈h〉 ∧M, e/h′ |= AtiR,
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Figure 1: At e/h agent α risks that AtiR.
2. ∃A ∈ Choiceαe ∀h′′ ∈ A :M, e/h′′ |= Ati¬R.
Risking so described relies on forsaking a sure thing in favor of a not-so-sure
thing. The concept is too strong, however. By the above explication, I should not
say that Alicja risked breaking her mug (even though she put it on the very edge
of our table), if I believe that, if left alone, the mug could still break, either for
some physical reasons, or because of the workings of other agents — our cat, for
instance. A question thus arises with respect to what do we risk? In particular,
should we require of a state that a risky agent forsake that it has a sure-thing
characteristic? We will return to this question in the next section.
Note also that in this analysis, attempting is ubiquitous. By deciding to spend
this day in bed, I would ensure that quite a few things would (not) happen. For
instance, I would ensure that my milk pot would now be intact. Yet, I got up,
I decided to boil milk for Alicja, put the pot on our stove, and . . . forgot about
it. The pot would have burned if my wife had not intervened. So, by deciding
to get up, I attempted to burn the pot, and most likely I attempted an indefinite
number of other things.
It seems we may improve on our first analysis by combining it with some
concept of guaranteeing: I attempted that R because first I risked that R and
second, although later I could still guarantee that ¬R, I did not do it. So we turn
next to guaranteeing.
4 Guaranteeing I
Consider the four diagrams of Figure 2. In each diagram at e/h it is true that
agent α risks that R at instant i. In the top two diagrams, after taking this risk
(by picking the “left” option), α can ensure at a later event e′ that ¬R at i. One
might got the impression, however, that guaranteeing is achieved by an accidental
fact: α’s choices at e′ (as coded by Choiceαe′) combine nicely with possibilities on
which α has no influence. In the top-right diagram, α has no way of choosing the
third history from the left rather than the first or the second, but fortunately, in
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this history we have ¬R at i. And in the top left diagram, there is simply no
history which α cannot choose.
The bottom two diagrams, however, contain histories that destroy guarantee-
ing, as they have R at i, and α cannot exclude them. Before addressing this
problem, we need to decide what should be on the right-hand side of those di-
agrams that illustrate guaranteeing. This amounts to deciding with respect to
what we risk or attempt. In other words, if Alicja attempted to break her mug by
taking such and such an action, what should we say would happen to the mug if
she did not take this action? What should be demanded of choice A ∈ Choiceαe ,
which α does not take at e/h, that is, A .= Choiceαe 〈h〉?
(1) Surely the mug would not break. Formally,
∀h′ ∈ A ∀e′ (e′ ∈ i ∩ h′ → e′/h′ |= ¬R.
Clearly, this condition is too strong. We may still believe that α risks breaking the
mug, even though we think that without α’s action the mug’s integrity is nonethe-
less endangered by our cat, a draught, or Mary’s action. A possible obstructive
action of some other agent does not get α off the hook, so to speak.
(2) Other agents, working separately or jointly, could ensure that the
mug is not broken. The idea is that option A contains a history in which the
mug is broken at i, but other agents have choices available that would lead to ¬R
at i in the appropriate history. This makes α’s attempting dependent on choices
available to other agents, and this is not a good idea.
(3) α herself might guarantee that ¬R. Despite having been able at e/h
to guarantee that ¬R at i, she chose at e another option such that she could
not later guarantee that ¬R at i. However, in the present reading we allow for
the obstructive actions of other agents and obstructive indeterministic workings
on the part of nature even in the “guaranteeing option”. The idea here is to
understand guaranteeing in a rather relaxed, or counterfactual way: if there were
no obstructive workings by other agents or nature, α could guarantee ¬R at i.
Thus the task is to put in brackets the obstructive workings of other agents and
nature. To analyze this idea, we will employ the concept of simple strategies of
Belnap, Xu, and Perloff (2001), which we even further simplify for the present
purposes.
5 Guaranteeing II and simple strategies
Our aim now is to analyze, in the framework of simple strategies, the phrase “α
can guarantee that Q at instant i”, where we assume the relaxed interpretation
of “guaranteeing” as indicated just above.
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Figure 2: Guaranteeing I.
A strategy s available for α ∈ Agents is a partial function on W such that:1
if e ∈ Dom(s), then s(e) ∈ Choiceαe .
We say that s is a strategy for α in field M if Dom(s) ⊆ M ⊂ W . To define
simple strategies, one needs the following notions:
1. Admissibility: s admits e iff
∀e0 (e0 ∈ Dom(s) ∧ e0 < e→ e ∈
⋃
s(e0));
2. Primariness: strategy s is primary iff e ∈ Dom(s)→ s admits e;
3. Backward closure: for strategy s for α in field M , we say that s is backward
closed in M iff
∀e1, e2 (e2 ∈ Dom(s) ∧ e1 < e2 ∧ e1 ∈M → e1 ∈ Dom(s));
4. Simplicity: a strategy s for α in M is simple iff it is primary and backward
closed in M .
Consider now the set of histories such that at the pair “event e, history”, the
sentence “AtiQ” is true, i.e.,:
HAtiQe = {h ∈ H(e) | e/h |= AtiQ}.
1To simplify, we assume here that a strategy is strict in the sense that s(e) ∈ Choiceαe , rather
than s(e) ∈ P(Choiceαe ).
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Figure 3: Alicja and our cat at the table. White and shadowed boxes represent
Alicja’s actions and our cat’s actions, respectively.
With this set, we explain the phrase “α can guarantee that Q at instant i” as
follows:
e/h |= α can guarantee that Q at instant i iff there is a simple strategy s for α in
M =
⋃
Choiceαe 〈h〉 such that:
⋂
x∈Dom(s) s(x) ⊆ HAtiQe .
Let us return to Alicja’s actions at the table. The situation is depicted by
Figure 3, with white boxes representing Alicja’s choices and a shadowed box indi-
cating the choices of some other agent, say, our cat. Can Alicja guarantee that the
mug is not broken, ¬R, at instant i? At e/h it is not true that she can guarantee
that ¬R at i: there is no strategy for Alicja with field M = ⋃ChoiceAlicjae 〈h〉
such that
⋂
x∈Dom(s) s(x) ⊆ HAti¬Re . In other words, if Alicja selects the “left”
option at e, she cannot guarantee that the mug is not broken. However, she can
guarantee this, if she chooses the “right” option at e, because there is a strategy
for Alicja with field M =
⋃
ChoiceAlicjae 〈h′′〉 such that ⋂x∈Dom(s) s(x) ⊆ HAti¬Re
for arbitrary h′′ ∈ ChoiceAlicjae 〈h′〉. The strategy relies on taking the “right” op-
tion at e and then the “left” option at e′′. Note that in the “right” option the
verdict is that Alicja can guarantee . . . , despite a possible obstruction by our cat
at e′.
6 A final analysis
We have come to our final analysis:
e/h |= α attempts that AtiR iff
1. e/h |.= AtiR, and
2. e/h |.= α can guarantee that ¬AtiR, and
3. there is h′ ∈ H(e) such that: e/h′ |= α can guarantee that ¬AtiR.
My story about Alicja’s behavior at the table now goes like this: At e/h Alicja
attempted to break her mug in 1 sec. How did she do that? At e/h she placed
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her mug on an edge of our table. At this event it was not yet settled whether the
mug would break: both scenarios were possible. Alicja had other options at e:
she might have left her mug in front of her, where it stood. Yet, even if she had
chosen to leave the mug, it might still have broken, which might have happened
spontaneously (the farmost right history), or not. In the latter scenario, our cat
will come to the mug (event e). The cat will face a choice, to break the mug
outright or to play with it. In the latter option, Alicja has a choice to save the
mug or not (at e′′), by chasing the cat away or not.
7 Objections
Our analysis leaves aside the intentional aspects of agents’ actions. The two
objections presented below try to show that, as a result, the analysis is both too
wide and too narrow.
Consider a careful pedestrian on a sidewalk, choosing whether or not to start
crossing the street. As there is no incoming traffic to be seen at this moment,
he elects to briskly walk through the crossing. When he is in the middle of the
road, however, with a cosmic velocity a mad car appears, heading directly towards
him. Fortunately, the mad driver turns his vehicle left at the last moment, saving
the pedestrian. Now, did the pedestrian attempt to get injured by deciding to
cross the street? Clearly, given his option of not crossing the street, he could
arguably guarantee that he be uninjured. He chose to cross the street, however,
the consequence being that he could not guarantee that he be uninjured. So, by
our analysis, the pedestrian attempted to get injured. But, intuitively speaking,
he did not. “It was not his intention to get injured” comes as a natural comment.2
In the second story, a platoon of soldiers is surrounded by a dreadful enemy.3
There is no way for them to escape the ambush. Nevertheless, the commanding
officer gives the platoon an order to attack. As a result, all the soldiers die. The
officer, later tried for foolhardily sending his soldiers to certain death, maintains
a defense that by giving the order to attack, he attempted to get the platoon out
of the ambush. So his fate depends on the truth at e/h of the sentence: “The
officer attempts that the platoon be out of the ambush at some later instant i”,
where e is a moment of issuing the order and h is an arbitrary history in which
the trial occurs. In symbols,
e/h |= the officer attempts that Ati Out .
The prosecution, however, has solid evidence that it was impossible to escape the
ambush. Also, on the basis of prior evidence concerning the enemy’s cruelty, it
is clear that if the soldiers had surrendered, the enemy would have killed them.
Thus, well before issuing the order, there was no possible scenario in which the
platoon survives. This means that in every history comprising the event of issuing
2I owe this example to John Kearns.
3This story comes from Tim Childers. I am indebted to Micha!l Araszkiewicz for explaining
to me the definitions of attempting as they occur in the Polish criminal code.
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the order the sentence ¬ Out is true at instant i. By the concept of guaranteeing,
this means that at e/h the officer can guarantee that ¬Ati Out. Accordingly, the
second clause of our final analysis is not satisfied, so this analysis yields a negative
verdict: the officer did not attempt to get his platoon out of the ambush.
Common sense might say the opposite, in particular, if the officer convincingly
shows that (1) he thought (mistakenly) that the situation was not hopeless and
(2) he had a plan (unrealistic, as it was) of how to rescue the soldiers, and the
order in question was a part of this plan. As far as I could learn, the court verdict
might go both ways, depending on the nature of the officer’s mistaken assessment
of the situation.
My own views agree with the final analysis, however. The officer did not
attempt to rescue the platoon. He thought (believed) that he was attempting to
save the platoon, and, perhaps, one can even make a case that he was justified
in believing that he was attempting to save the platoon. Nevertheless, my strong
intuition is that, given the hopeless predicament, the officer was mistaken: he was
not attempting to save the platoon.4
Dismissing the second story as a counter-example to the final analysis, I am left
with the first story which shows that the analysis is too wide. The story, however,
suggests clearly a condition to be added to our analysis: an agent’s intention. The
challenge (which we do not know how to address) is to express this condition in
the stit framework, however. For the record, I nevertheless put down this idea as
an informal, unofficial, and post-final analysis:
e/h |= α attempts that AtiR iff
1. e/h |.= AtiR, and
2. e/h |.= α can guarantee that ¬AtiR, and
3. there is h′ ∈ H(e) such that: e/h′ |= α can guarantee that ¬AtiR, and
4. e/h |= α intends that AtiR.
Examples similar to our first story as well as criminal codes indicate that
intending, planning, or even pre-meditating have some role in attempting. To
obtain some clarity about what exactly this role is will be a task for a future
project. Yet another task is to see if the recent stit logic for belief, desire, and
intention by Semmling andWansing (2009) can be harnessed to analyze the mental
aspects of attempting.
Tomasz Placek
Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University
Grodzka 52, 31-044 Krako´w, Poland.
tomasz.placek@uj.edu.pl
4Of course, I am applying here a weak understanding of justification according to which we
can have justified false beliefs.
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